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Classifying Supreme Court Concurrences: The Case of Justice Clarence
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Literature on the courts has demonstrated
a rise in concurrences on the Supreme Court, but little attention has
been given to the content of concurring
opinions . Such
an exp/ oration has become crucial , as the number of
concurrences
has increased in recent decades, revealing
a heightened sense of ideological
division on the Court .
Informed by new institutional
concerns we contend that
analysis of concurrences may provide evidence regarding
how justices consider the institutional
legitimacy of the
Cour t, how they deal with precedent
as a constraint
and / or tool for their decision making , how they feed political discourse by attending to particular positions, and
how poli tics are constituted within the Court . We develop
a se t of codes for classifying
the content of concurring
opinions as "Groundlaying,"
"Signaling,"
"Preserving,"
"Defending,"
or "Weakening."
We apply the codes to
empirical data by examining the concurrences
of Justice
Clarence Thomas. We conclu de that this coding scheme,
with some minor adaptations,
will be an effective tool for
understanding
the concurring behavior of the Court .
• Authors ' Note : The authors thank Christopher Banks, John Maltese, and Nancy
Maveety for helpful comments, and Tinsley Yarbrough for chairing the conference panel
which included an earlier draft of this work. We also wish to thank Jessica Bernier and
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"I plead with y ou that, whatever y ou do, don 't try to
apply the rules of the political world to this institution;
1
they do not apply. "-Clarence Thomas

U

nderstandably, in the study of Supreme Court decisions,
most researchers focus on majority opinions because
these become the law of the land. However, research has
illustrated that dissents and concurrences can have a unique, if
often delayed, influence in providing grounds for future reconsideration of the law by the Supreme Court, and may provide
reasons to overturn the original ruling (see, for example, Primus
1998). In addition, the growth in the number of separate opinions
over time suggests a need for scholarly attentiveness; there were,
for example, ten times more concurring opinions written in the
1980s than there were in the 1940s.2 Our goal here is to focus on
understanding the content of concurrences. Specifically, we seek
out patterns in concurring behavior by classifying the content of
these opinions according to five broad categories that we outline
below. In brief, informed by new institutional concerns we investigate five broad themes of concurring behavior: Groundlaying,
Signaling, Preserving, Defending, and Weakening. Because this
is a first attempt at systematically accounting for the content of
such opinions, we focus on the concurrences of a single justice,
Clarence Thomas, to assess the relevance of the codes we have
generated. The questions we explore are what goals are demonstrated in concurring opinions? Do justices attempt to lay legal
foundations for future cases? Do concurrences send messages to
potential litigants regarding which cases to pursue? Do concurrences merely note justices' unique perspectives? Do justices
1
Statement from a speech to high school students in 2000. Quoted in Thomas (2001,
586) ,
2
Supreme Court A to Z (2002).
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reveal institutional and political concerns in separate opinions?
Analysis of Thomas's concurrences allows us to offer tentative
answers to these questions.
Since our main objective is to ascertain the accuracy and
relevance of our proposed codes, we focus on only one justice as
a case study. We selected Clarence Thomas because of the current Court members, he will likely be on the bench the longest.
In a 1993 New York Times article he was quoted as saying: "The
liberals made my life miserable for 43 rears, and I'm going to
make their lives miserable for 43 years.' Even if Thomas is not
to be taken literally here, he is the youngest member, and the
point is well made. Additionally and importantly, Thomas currently finds himself in the majority most of the time. If George
W. Bush makes any appointments, he is likely to remain in this
position for years to come. Being both in the majority and far
from the median ideological position makes Thomas a likely
4
candidate for frequent concurrences in the future.
One reason to devote attention to concurrences is because
these opinions are the ones potentially less likely to be shaped by
compromise to please other justices and, therefore, are the opinions best suited for understanding the motivations for and consequences of actions by particular justices. As Baum notes
A justice who disagrees with the majority opinion
generally writes or joins in a dissenting or concurring
opinion. Because they are individual expressions
rather than statements for the Court, both types of
opinions can vary a great deal in form and tone. For
the same reason, they usually reveal more about the
author's views, and often express those views in
more colorful language, than do majority opinions
(2000, 135).
3

Quoted in Baum (2000, 74). Original source of the quotation is: Neil A. Lewis , "2 Years
after his bruising hearing, Justice Thomas still shows the hurt," New York Times, 27
November I 993, p. 6.
' Moreover, Thomas ' s reticence during oral argument suggests that written opinions
might be the best, and perhaps sole, location for identifying the Justice 's point of view.
(We are indebted to an anonymous referee for this observation .)
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Moreover, Wahlbeck, Spriggs, and Maltzman (1999, 504)
also note that dissenting opinions tend to be assigned, but concurring opinions are entirely self-selecting.
We seek to understand the way in which justices concur and
the fonn concurrences take. Our goal is to begin a conversation
regarding the content of concurrences and to assess whether our
proposed coding scheme is useful. Beginning with the concurrences of one justice seems a reasonable place to start. If these
codes prove to be instructive regarding concurrence behavior,
then we will continue this project by extending the examination
of concurrence content to all the justices of the Rehnquist Court. 5
We begin by discussing the broader significance of concurrences, a previously under-studied unit of analysis. Indeed, while
statistical compilations of opinions are available (see Spaeth
200 I), little systematic work has been done to explore the content of concurring opinions. There seems to be general agreement regarding what majority opinions do: they create, change,
and/or clarify the law. However, scholarly understanding of what
is accomplished (or not) in concurrences is far less developed.
We discuss the decline of consensus on the Supreme Court, the
influence of new institutional approaches on our work, define
our categories of concurring behavior, put Thomas's opinion
writing behavior in context, explain what our coding endeavors
revealed, and make recommendations for future research.
By engaging in the five types of activity we identify, Thomas
offers an important piece in the puzzle of concurring behavior. If
other justices illustrate similar concurring strategies, then justices
are not merely revealing policy (or attitudinal) preferences, but
rather to varying degrees are also considering the institutional
history of the Court's reliance on previous minority opinions to
provide a basis for future rulings that depart from precedent,
5

See Way and Turner (2003) .
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providing potential litigants with strategies, and attempting to
narrow the legal reasoning of the Court.
THE DECLINEOF CONSENSUS

Separate opinions have been criticized for diminishing the
Court's opinion, the weight of law, and the legitimacy of courts
(Walker, Epstein, and Dixon 1988; Ulmer 1970). Concurrences
especially have been ridiculed as "judicial egocentrism" (Caldeira and Zorn 1998, 877). One defense of concurring and dissenting opinions is that they indicate that the case has "received
careful consideration" (Moorhead 1952, 822). Yet, as O'Brien
(1996, 322) aptly put it, "When individual opinions are more
highly prized than opinions for the Court, consensus declines and
the Court's rulings and policy-making appear more fragmented,
less stable, and less predictable." Hence, an argument made in
the literature is that the rise of concurrences indicates a decline
in consensual norms. However, if many concurrences simply
note for the record a clarifying point of little significance, their
presence may not undermine the strength of majority opinions.
On the other hand, the majority of concurrences may fundamentally undermine the reasoning of the Court's opinion by offering
different legal tests than those used by the majority. Since there
has been no systematic review of the content of concurrences,
these questions remain largely unanswered.
Widespread court dissension arose in the twentieth century.
Some scholars argue that the declining norm of consensus began
with the Stone Court (Walker, Epstein, and Dixon 1988) and others argue that perhaps consensual norms of the Court showed
signs of diminishing as early as the Hughes (Haynie 1992) or
Taft Courts (Caldeira and Zorn 1998, 892). O'Brien (1999, 103)
attributes the beginning of the rise of concurrences and dissents
to FDR's New Deal appointees who "infused American Legal
Realism and liberal legalism into the Court" and began revealing
VOL.
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their disagreements through opinions. The rise of minority opinions has been largely, but not solely, attributed to the leadership
priorities or style of Chief Justices (Walker, Epstein, and Dixon
1998; Haynie 1992; Caldeira and Zorn 1998). Other possible
influences on the rise of concurrences and dissents include the
increase in the number of law clerks and secretaries as well as
the introduction of computer technology, which has made it easier for justices to pen numerous opinions (O'Brien 1999).
In addition to documenting the decline of consensus, scholars
have begun to reveal when or under what conditions it is likely
that justices will author or join concurrences or dissents. 6 Ulmer
(1970) argued that personal characteristics about a justice, such
as religion and background as a lawyer, influence one's likelihood to dissent. Gerber and Park ( 1997) found that the members
of the Rehnquist Court were more nonconsensual on the Supreme Court than they had been on the appellate courts on which
they sat, and ultimately concluded that what mattered most regarding the behavior of Supreme Court justices was the justices'
policy preferences. The team of Wahlbeck, Spriggs and Maltzman has done a particularly good job of discussing when, and
perhaps why, justices concur or dissent. For example, they found
that Burger Court ( 1999) justices were less likely to concur when
they were ideologically close to the majority opinion writer,
when they frequently sided with the majority opinion writer, and
it was near the end of the term. The documented decline of consensus on the Court and explanations of when justices are likely
to write concurrences and dissents have contributed to a broader
understanding of judicial decision-making. Though scholars are
6

"Studies of state courts illustrate that method of opinion assignment, presence of an
intermediate appellate court, and method of judicial selection (election or appointment)
affect judicial consensus (Hall and Brace 1989). Jaros and Canon (1971) also found that
the presence of an intermediate level appellate court influences dissent rate. Such findings might help explain the d~namics of the Supreme Court.
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beginning to reveal when concurrences are likely to be written,
still absent is what justices are writing about in those concurrences. In the next section we discuss how new institutional
work has informed our examination of the content of concurrences.
MAKINGMEANINGOF CONTENT

While clearly much has been learned by thorough examinations of judicial votes on particular cases, public law scholars
have begun to emphasize the need to look beyond votes as reflections of justices' policy preferences. New institutionalism has
reminded political scientists of the power of institutional development and incentives and constraints of particular institutional
configurations. Public law scholars have begun to embrace the
central tenets of new institutionalism and produce a wide variety
of works using this approach (e.g., Clayton and Gillman 1999;
7
Gillman and Clayton 1999). Informed by such approaches we
contend that concurrences may provide evidence regarding how
justices consider the institutional legitimacy of the Court, how
they deal with precedent as a constraint on and/or tool for their
decision making, how politics are constituted within the Court,
and how they feed political discourse by attending to particular
positions. Clayton and Gillman argue that "it is only with reference to the goals and motivations of the justices, not just to their
votes, that we can explore some of the characteristics of the
Court as an institution and its relationship to larger political
structures" (1999, 2). It might just be that indications of justices'
"goal and motivations" lie in separate opinions.

7

Also see Smith ( 1997) for a compelling argument regarding various traditions that are
part of American Cc'lstitutional and legal development.
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One of the many contributions of new institutional approaches has been to reemphasize an old tenet of the (prebehaviorialist) legal model-precedent matters. While Court
scholars have not ignored this important aspect of the legal system, the focus on attitudes and policy preferences often says little about the influence of legal precedent. 8 An examination of the
text of concurrences may reveal the influence of stare decisis,
which is often discussed as an institutional constraint or consideration. Furthermore, concurrences may include a variety of
messages to potential litigants regarding the types of arguments
to which they are sympathetic (see Signaling below). Such behavior clearly bestows some credibility on particular positions
and may contribute to political discourse in a particular ideological direction. With the major tenets of new institutionalism in
mind, we developed five different categories for describing concurrences that we believe will further understanding of the Court
and its justices.
Thematic Analysis
For these categories to be meaningful, and eventually helpful
to other scholars and court watchers, we needed to elucidate the
codes in a thorough manner-such that an individual reading any
concurrence would categorize that concurrence in the same manner we would. In this section we discuss how we went about
coding each concurrence and thoroughly describe each type of
concurrence behavior. In order to compare the content of concurrences, we employ thematic analysis. This process provides for
the categorization of qualitative information; it helps make 'thick
description' comparable. 9 In this project, thematic analysis in1

Of course, the exception to this is discussing precedentas something to be circumvented
ifjustices do not agree with it.
9
For a discussion of this method, see Boyatzis (1998).
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volved the development of a set of codes for identifying recurring themes, goals, and effects in concurring opinions. Based on
existing theories about the purposes of concurring opinions, we
created some initial categories for describing concurrences.
Next, we began a detailed reading of each of Thomas's concurrences. Specifically, we looked for both particular phrases, including key words, in an opinion and the general goal of the
concurrence, which could be traced back to the text of the opinion. For example, a phrase such as, "I write separately to note
that the majority is using the wrong legal test" would be clear
indication that the concurrence was Groundlaying (as we will
describe the code below). Turner read first and coded the opinions according to the typology described in Table 1. Turner further refined the categories during the course of the analysis and
assigned multiple codes to cases when appropriate. 10 Next, Way
read and coded the cases independently in order to assure interrater reliability. After we both completed coding, we identified
any disagreements and re-read those cases. The initial ~eement
rate was 79%; re-reading increased that figure to 85%. 1 All remaining discrepancies were eliminated in conference. While
there has been an increase in the use of computer software to
code texts (e.g., NUD*IST, WordStat), such technology is not
well-suited to this project due to the nature of the opinions. Specifically, justices often refer back to previous cases and the positions they took in prior opinions and it is necessarily to be
familiar with those references in order to accurately understand

0
' In other words, cases that both signaled future litigants and defended a particular interpretive approach were assigned two codes, one for each behavior exhibited .
11
This coding procedure follows, in part, the very thorough process described in Appendix B of Richards and Kritzer (2002) . Regard ing percentage agreement as a method of
assessing interrater reliability Boyatzis ( 1998, 156) notes: "Typically, scores of 70% or
better are considered necessary in this type of research."
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the point the justice is making. Hence, this is work that needs to
be done the old fashioned way.
Ground/aying. These categories require further elaboration
and examples. Groundlaying cases are those in which the author

TABLE 1
TYPES OF CONCURRENCES

Category
Groundlaying

Signaling

Preserving

Defending
Weakening

Description
establishes an alternative test or interpretation for
possible future use; points to a different part of the
Constitution or different statute than does the majority opinion
speculates on how the justice might decide future
cases; indicates to future litigants what types of
cases to bring or arguments to make; goes out of the
way to discuss issues not in contention
provides a descriptive history; 'just noting" for the
record; sometimes expresses a warning or expresses
annoyance
defends a philosophical or interpretive approach
(e.g., original intent, judicial restraint)
narrows the scope of the majority opinion (and,
therefore, its stare decisis power) by specifically
pointing to disagreements with the majority opinion

declares an interpretive difference with the majority opinion and
often presents an alternative strategy for deciding such cases.
The justice may lay out the possibility of applying a different test
or standard for a case or class of cases, possibly in hopes of a
Court majority adopting that approach in the future. He or she
might also point out the majority's flaws without specifying a
preferred alternative. To illustrate this last point, consider Thomas's writing in United States v. Morrison. In this case, which
addressed the Violence Against Women Act, Thomas concurs
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
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The majority opinion correctly applies our decision in
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and I
join it in full. I write separately only to express my
view that the very notion of a "substantial effects"
test under the Commerce Clause is inconsistent with
the original understanding of Congress' powers and
with this Court's early Commerce Clause cases . 12

This opinion suggests that in the future Thomas would be
open to abolishing the use of the substantial effects test when
considering Commerce Clause cases. That is quite a departure
from the modem Court's interpretation of this clause and suggests that the Justice's opinion could lay the foundation for future endorsement of his approach. This concurring strategy
achieves the objective of distinguishing the author's path to the
disposition from that taken by the majority or plurality. If the
issue at hand is one the justice has addressed previously, the
opinion may be quite short, merely referencing a disagreement in
a previous case. For example, in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association v. UnitRd States Thomas writes: "I continue
to adhere to my view that .. .the Central Hudson test should not
be applied."t 3 In doing so, he briefly quotes his concurrence
from 44 Liqourmart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, a case from three
years earlier. 14
Signaling. In Signaling cases, the justice goes beyond merely
stating a difference of opinion and discusses directly the points
of law that he or she would like to revisit in a future case. 15
These concurrences say very specifically that Thomas would like
to review a particular case or would have liked to discuss a specific point of law but neither the petitioner nor the respondent
12

529 U.S. 598 (2000) .
527 U.S. 173 (1999) .
14
517 U.S. 484 (1996) .
" O'Brien ( 1996, 327) also uses the term signal in this way and notes that Justice Stevens
finds such writings to be advisory opinions.
11
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raised the issue in the case at hand. Serving as a signal to potential litigants, the opinion states a willingness to take the Court's
reasoning further in an area of law, or even to change directions,
or break with precedent. Thomas signals his dissatisfaction with
precedent in Cooper Industries , Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group,
Inc. when he writes: "I continue to believe that the Constitution
does not constrain the size of punitive damage awards . ... For
this reason, given the opportunity, I would vote to overrule
BMW. This case, however , does not present such an opportunity." 16 Sometimes , the issue the justice is signaling differs from
the point of law under consideration in the present case. In such
instances, the justice appears to be going out of his or her way to
discuss a tangential point, or a point that the justice hoped the
parties would have addressed in their briefs. Thomas si?,nals his
broader views on gun control in Printz v. United States. In this
case, the point of law that litigants and the majority opinion discuss is the Tenth Amendment. Thomas, though, extrapolates
This Court has not had recent occasion to consider
the nature of the substantive right safeguarded by the
Second Amendment. If, however, the Second
Amendment is read to confer a personal right to
"keep and bear arms," a colorable argument exists
that the Federal Government's regulatory scheme, at
least as it pertains to the purely intrastate sale or possession of firearms, runs afoul of that Amendment's
protections. As the parties did not raise this argument, however, we need not consider it here. 18

It would be difficult for interested potential litigants to overlook such a plain statement of Thomas's willingness to reconsider the direction of the Court's jurisprudence regarding the
Second Amendment. His last phrase seems slightly ironic as he

16

532 U.S. 424 (2001).
521 U.S. 898 (1997) .
11
/bid ., foohlotes omitted .
17
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clearly is considering the issue to the extent that he wrote a concurrence on the topic.
Preserving. The Preserving approach is one in which the justice presents arguments or historical descriptions that seem to
hold little utility for future jurisprudence. These opinions may
describe portions of American history, legal or otherwise, or they
may be expressions of the justice's reasoning process that, for
whatever reason, he or she wishes to preserve in writing. An example of a Preserving concurrence that is merely recording historical description is Capitol Square v. Pinette in which
Thomas's concurrence of four paragraphs relates the history of
the Ku Klux Klan's use of burning crosses. 19 His point, for the
record, was that such an act was political and not religious in
nature. The tone of such opinions can range from mundane reflection to pithy annoyance with other members of the Court to
full blown jeremiad warning the reader of the dangers of the majority's interpretation. As an example of this latter tone, consider
Thomas's statement in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board: "I
fully anticipate ... that as a result of today's holding, all of the
problems we have experienced in §2 vote dilution cases will now
be replicated and, indeed, exacerbated in the §5 retrogression
inquiry." 20 This proclamation warns of future dangers, but as
these dangers exist in a section of the law that the present case
does not touch, all Thomas can do is lament. Criticizing a dissenting opinion, as well, has little bearing on the present course
of law, but a justice may wish to preserve the arguments against
the dissent in case future jurists are tempted by its reasoning.
Justice Thomas demonstrates this desire to have his observations
preserved 'for the record' in United Dominion Industries v.
United States when he states: "I write separately, however, be19
20

515 U.S. 753 (1995) .
520 U.S . 471 (1997) .
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cause I respectfully disagree with the dissent's suggestion that,
when a provision of the Code and the corresponding regulations
are ambiguous, this Court should defer to the Government's interpretation."21 While Preserving opinions take many forms, they
all present a minor, or even non-germane, clarification of the
Justice's views.
Defending. The Defending concurrence is an effort to defend
an approach to legal philosophy that spans beyond the confines
of the present case. Occasionally the majority opinion, or a dissent, provokes a justice into writing separately in order to champion a philosophical or interpretive approach, such as original
intent or judicial restraint. These opinions illustrate a broader
ideological divide than a particular case and instead advocate a
judicial philosophy. There are relatively few such broad philosophies-the Constitution as a living document, textualism, original intent, for example. The approach taken by another opinion
might lead the concurring justice to extol the importance of
common law antecedents, or defend analyzing the plain meaning
of the text prior to a consideration of legislative intent. On this
point, consider Thomas's concurrence in Cornell Johnson v.
United States: "I agree with the Court's textual analysis ... and
think that analysis sufficient to resolve this case .... I would not
rely, as the Court ... and Justice Kennedy ... do, on any apparent
congressional purpose supporting the Court's reading of
§3583(e)(3)." 22 In these concurrences the justice is not simply
stating that a different test should be used in this particular case
(which would be coded Groundlaying), but rather that a different
approach should be used in an entire body of cases. For example,
original intent should be examined when deciding any claim involving the Establishment Clause, or a plain reading of the text
21
22

532 U.S. 822 (2001) .
529 U.S. 694 (2000) .
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should be used when interpreting Congressional legislation.
Thomas illustrates this type of concurrence in Farmer v. Brennan : "the Court's prison condition jurisprudence bas been
guided, not by the text of the Constitution, but rather by 'evolving standards of decency' .. .I continue to doubt the legitimacy of
that mode of constitutional decision-making . ... "23 In such concurrences Thomas takes issue not just with a majority opinion,
but with a larger interpretive approach.
Weakening. Finally, the Weakening concurrence is one in
which the justice narrows the scope and authority of the majority
opinion by emphasizing the points at which he or she departs
from the majority's reasoning. Often, this has the effect of narrowing the breadth of the Court's opinion in some way, possibly
turning parts of the majority opinion into a non-controlling plurality. We expected this to occur most often in special concurrences that concur only in part or in the judgment. It is important
to note here that the Weakening category is not a psychological
assessment of the author; we make no claims that the writer is
intentionally seeking to muddle the Court's decision, or weaken
the Court as an institution. We merely suggest that some concurrences have this effect. As Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck
(2000, 68) note : "a concurring opinion can ultimately serve as a
sanction by articulating flaws in the majority opinion. By providing alternative ways to view the legal rule underlying the majority opinion, separate opinions can influence how the majority
opinion is perceived, and even implemented, by judges, political
decision makers, or private parties. In this sense, separate opinions possibly weaken the precedential basis of an opinion."
Indeed, the breadth of the stare decisis power of Lynce v.
Mathis is likely compromised when Justice Thomas writes: ''Under these narrow circumstances, I agree with the Court that the
23

511 U.S. 825 (1994) .
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State's retroactive nullification of petitioner's previously accrued, and then used, release credits violates the Constitution's
ban on ex post-facto lawmaking. I do not, however, join the majority's discussion of Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981),
which I find unnecessary to the resolution of this case. "24 In another concurrence, Republic National Bank of Miami v. US.,
Thomas wrote, "I cannot join the Court's discussion of jurisdiction because that discussion is unnecessary and may very well
constitute an advisory opinion." 25 Whether it is Thomas's goal or
not, such opinions have a potentially weakening--or at least narrowing-effect on the majority opinion.
If justices are not engaging in serious doctrinal work in their
concurrences, then we would expect that the most frequent category would be Preserving. If, however, justices use concurrences
to set the framework for a change in how particular areas of case
law are determined, then we would expect to see a high percentage of Groundlaying and Weakening concurrences. A high percentage of Defending concurrences would indicate that justices
are using concurrences to advocate a particular philosophy,
which may or may not be linked to case outcomes. Finally, if
justices frequently engage in Signaling behavior in their concurrences, then perhaps they are comfortable indicating the types of
arguments they are open to and, by extension, are granting legitimacy to specific political positions.
While there are certainly concurrences that exhibit only one
type of concurring behavior, there is no reason to asswne that
justices engage in just one of these categories in each concurrence. In fact, we asswne that in many cases justices will engage
in more than one type of concurrence behavior. For example, it
makes perfect sense that a justice might both note his or her
24

lS

519 U.S. 433 ( 1997).
506 U.S. 80 ( 1992).
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TABLE2
JUSTICES' VOTES AND 0PINIONS 2 1991-2000 TERMS
Justice/
Voting Behavior
Authored Opinions
Decision Type
Frequency
Frequency Percent
Percent
Thomas
majority or plurality
822
72.7
83
37 .2
dissent
183
16.2
72
32.3
regular concurrence
61
6.4
39
25.8
special concurrence
6.8
29
19.2
65
Total
1131
223
Rehnquist
majority or plurality
85.0
109
61.2
990
dissent
140
49
27 .5
12.0
regular concurrence
16
1.6
12
9.3
special concurrence
19
1.9
8
6.2
Total
1165
178
Stevens
majority or plurality
57.8
21.l
670
95
dissent
29.9
346
233
51.7
regular concurrence
51
59
7.3
23.3
special concurrence
84
10.3
72
33 .0
Total
1159
451
O'Connor
majority or plurality
44.9
930
80.5
105
dissent
125
10.8
61
26 .l
regular concurrence
5.9
44
25.4
61
special concurrence
3.8
24
13.9
39
234
Total
1155
Scalia
majority or plurality
837
72.2
97
30.8
dissent
177
15.3
30 .2
95
regular concurrence
28.6
73
7.4
63
special concurrence
27.2
72
7.3
60
Total
1159
315
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preference for a different legal test than the majority (Groundlaying) and indicate that he or she would have voted differently had
the plaintiff raised this particular legal issue (Signaling) in the
same opinion. While, of course, there is generally a desire for
categories to be mutually exclusive, we think in this case such a
scheme would oversimplify the variety of behaviors contained in
concurrences. With a more thorough understanding of the categories in mind, the following section explains Thomas's voting
behavior and opinion writing compared to his fellow Rehnquist
Court members.
Thomas In Context
Before examining the substance of Thomas's opinions
specifically, we will situate his separate writing within the
broader institutional context. Justice Thomas took his seat on the
Court October 23, 1991 and took part in his first case on November 4, 1991. As seen below in Table 2, Justice Thomas took
part in either a regular or special concurrence about 13.2% of the
time in which he voted with the majority during his first decade
on the bench. During this period, only Stevens (17.6%), Scalia
(14.7%), and Breyer (13.4%) concurred more often. Concurrences comprised 45% of Thomas's non-dissenting written opinions, the third highest percentage behind Stevens (56.3%) and
Scalia (55.8%). In numbers of concurrences, Thomas's 68 pmany
concurrences as Stevens and Scalia (both with 123).26 While
Thomas is not the most prolific concurrer, these comparisons

26

Ginsburg and Breyer have fewer due to a shorter period on the bench during the time
period under investigation . Rehnquist 's paltry concurrence totals are consistent with
previous findings regarding the tendency of chief justices to refrain from writing separately (for example, see Wahlbeck, Spriggs , and Maltzman 1999; Maltzman, Spriggs, and
Wahlbeck 2000) . Scalia's high number is perhaps not surprising , as he has publicly embraced concurrences (Scal ia 1994).
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TABLE2
JUSTICES' VOTES AND OPINIONS, 1991-2000 TERMS
(continued)
Justice/
Voting Behavior
Authored Opinions
Decision Type
Frequency
Percent
Frequency
Percent
Kennedy
majority or plurality
1001
85.7
93
49.5
75
6.4
dissent
30
16.0
51
4.7
regular concurrence
38
24.1
special concurrence
41
3.8
27
17.1
Total
1168
188
Souter
majority or plurality
905
77.7
91
41.9
13.6
64
dissent
159
29.5
regular concurrence
61
6.1
37
24.2
special concurrence
40
4.0
25
17.1
Total
217
1165
Ginsburg
majority or plurality
634
73.5
73
42.4
146
dissent
16.9
49
28.5
regular concurrence
53
7.4
34
27.6
special concurrence
29
4.1
16
13.0
Total
862
172
Breyer
majority or plurality
512
70.3
34.7
58
dissent
18.8
137
69
41.3
regular concurrence
50
8.5
25
25.5
special concurrence
29
4.9
15
15.3
Total
728
167
Data derived from Spaeth (200 I). Data for Justice Ginsburg begin with 1993 and for
Justice Breyer begin with 1994. For concurrences, percent is calculated as the percent
of cases in which the justice concurred out of the total number in which he or she
voted with the majority.
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indicate that he is more likely than most other justices both to
concur and to author his own concurrence. Though concurrences
are the most likely types of opinions to be signed by a single individual, 13 of Thomas's 68 concurrences were joined by another justice, Scalia in each case. The relationship betweenlace
him slightly above the median, though he wrote just over half as
these two conservative justices appears even stronger when one
observes that these 13 cases comprise 52% of all the cases in
which Scalia joined another justice's concurrence during this
decade. 27
Wahlbeck, Spriggs, and Maltzrnan (1999) found that Burger
Court justices were less likely to author concurrences when justices who are ideologically closer to the justice in question write
the majority. Caldeira and Zorn (I 998) also see the nonn of reciprocity as a likely factor that influences the choice of justices
regarding whether to write separately or not. Furthennore, they
found that justices who often cooperate with one another are less
likely to write concurrences when the colleague whom the justice cooperates with writes the majority opinion. Consistent with
this research, Thomas was significantly less likely to concur
when Rehnquist or Scalia authored the opinion of the court. 28
Hence, in various ways Thomas is not so atypical in his concurring behavior as to make him an undesirable candidate for the
evaluation of our proposed codes.29

27

Likewise, Thomas joined 40 of Scalia's concurrences , representing 63% of all the
concurrences Thomas joined . The connection between these two jurists is welldocumented. The American Lawyer (2001) , for example, reports that Scalia and Thomas
have been in vote alignment between 82.8% and 97.7% percent of the time for each term
between 1991 and 2000 (reprinted in "Friends and Foes" 200 I) .
21
Examining all cases where Thomas voted with the majority disposition, the correlation
between a Scalia or Rehnquist authored majority and Thomas writing a concurrence was
negative and significant (the Pearson correlation is -.070 at p < . I0, one-tailed).
29
Of course for many research questions Thomas would not be a good candidate (e.g., an
examination of nomination politics), but such concerns should not be the case given our
particular focus.
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REVEALING CONCURRING BEHAVIOR

We categorized all sixty of Thomas's concurrences for analysis.30Frequencies are reported in Table 3. Thomas's most prevalent concurring behavior was Groundlaying at over 58%.
Groundlaying concurrences are those engaging in substantive
legal departures from the majority's reasoning. As the theme
most typical of Thomas's concurrences, Groundlaying offers
some important insights into the act of concurring. First, it
clearly establishes that a justice does not have to dissent in order
to take issue with the majority's legal reasoning in an area of law.
On several occasions Thomas used a concurrence to establish his
TABLE3
FREQUENCIES FOR OPINION CHARACTERISTICS

Characteristic
Groundlaying
Signaling
Preserving
Defending
Weakening

Yes
35 (58.3%)
19 (31.7%)
24 (40.0%)
15 (25.0%)
14 (23.3%)

position favoring, for example , the use of strict scrutiny in commercial speech cases . Second, the prevalence of Groundlaying
supports scholars' contentions that a rise in concurrences may
indicate a factitious Court.3' For example, in Bank of America v.
203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, Thomas disagrees with the
majority's interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code and offers what

°

1

For the purposes of the stat istical analysis, I case (Holder v. Hall) was removed as an
outlier, making N = 59 for those tests. This total is slightly smaller than that found by
Spaeth due to differences in coding decisions which concur in part and dissent in part .
11
O'Brien (I 996, 285) offers that this may be because there is less deliberation and compromise about opinions due to a heavy workload.
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is, to his mind, a clearer alternative. 32 Declaring a different path
of reasoning indicates that, regardless of the case disposition,
there is a lack of agreement in an area of law that extends beyond what vote totals, as traditionally calculated, reveal. In fact,
Groundlaying behavior was positively correlated with writing a
special concurrence .33 Finally, Groundlaying may be an important precursor to future interpretive changes. Though we do not
measure the ultimate effects of this phenomenon, the fact that
Groundlaying concurrences present an alternative approach supported by at least one member of the Court suggests that this alternative could be a leading contender for the majority's
interpretation in the future. For example, if Thomas stakes out
his position favoring strict scrutiny in commercial speech in a
series of concurrences, then if Thomas ever has the opportunity
to construct a majority opinion on a case in this area of law, it
seems likely that this is the interpretive approach he would take.
While this claim is speculative, the prevalence of Groundlaying
concurrences suggests this scenario may be worthy of more attention in the future.
Thomas Signaled 31. 7% of the time. In nearly one-third of
his concurrences, Thomas indicated that he would like to overrule a particular case or review an entire body of precedent.
However, he clearly indicated that when litigants did not ask him
to review a previous case, he saw it as inappropriate to do so. He
might say, for example, that he did not agree that a precedent had
been properly decided, but since the parties in the present case
had accepted the precedent, he felt he must as well. These Signaling concurrences illustrate the power of institutional norms on
the Court. 34 Thomas is clearly indicating that he does not agree
32

526 U.S. 434 (1999).
The Pearson correlation is .392 at p < .0 I, one-tailed.
" See Kahn ( 1999) for more on the institutional constraint of stare decisis,
33
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with rulings but is unwilling to consider overruling them until a
party specifically asks him to do so. 35 The following are a couple
of examples of such behavior. In Georgia v. McCol/um Thomas
writes
As a matter of first impression, I think that I would
have shared the view of the dissenting opinions: A
criminal defendant's use of peremptory strikes cannot
violate the Fourteenth Amendment because it does
not involve state action. Yet, I agree with the Court
and the Chief Justice that our decision last tenn in
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. governs this
case and requires the opposite conclusion. Because
the respondents do not question Edmonson, I believe
that we must accept its consequences. I therefore
concur in the judgment .. . [emphasis added]. 36

Thomas even expressed such sentiments in an area of law in
which he has strongly advocated that the Court has been misguided. For example, the entire concurrence in South Central
Bell v. Alabama consists of "I join the opinion of the Court. I
agree that it would be inappropriate to take up the State's invitation to reconsider our negative Commerce Clause doctrine in this
case because 'the State did not make clear it intended to make
this argument until it filed its brief on the merits.' Ante, at 10." 37
He seems to be indicating to potential future litigants that they
should not make the same mistake.
Often, Thomas's Signals were not narrow, but rather indicated
that the justice disagrees with an entire area of Supreme Court
rulings. We think it is worth noting that he does not indicate once
that he disagrees with a body of precedent, but instead repeatedly
JS These opinions seem to ignore the power of the Court's ability to define the issue in the
case largely as they wish. See McGuire and Palmer (1995) on issue fluidity .
16
505 U.S. 42 (1992) .
"526 U.S. 160 (1999) .

VOL.

31 2003

162

TURNER& WAY

writes concurrences saying so in multiple cases regarding that
area of the law. This seems to be especially the case in Commerce Clause, vote dilution, and commercial speech cases.
Hence, in a few areas of law he repeatedly engages in Signaling
concurrence behavior.38 Such opinions point to a seeming judicial activism as he is essentially asking litigants to bring him
cases (Werrniel 2002). Perhaps Moorhead (1952, 884) was prophetic when he wrote
If a concurring or dissenting opinion is not written
with full respect for stare decisis, it serves neither to
improve our jurisprudence nor to afford a reliable basis for prediction . It is one thing to respect the doctrine of stare decisis, but, from time to time in a
dissenting or concurring opinion, to argue that a particular precedent is wrong or outmoded and should be
overruled. It is quite a different thing to indulge in an
iconoclastic endeavor to upset all that has gone before by making concurring and dissenting opinions
mere vehicles for the conveyance of pet ideologies ....
If the decisions of a court are consistently accompanied by concurring or dissenting opinions which represent attempts to substitute the impulses of the
present for the wisdom of the past, the law suffers,
and the only possible prediction is one of chaos.

Of course, Thomas's response to this is likely to be that he is
advocating a return to the original understanding of the issue or
principle in question, which the Court has unfortunately ignored
for a period of time. 39
31

This is consistent with Gerber's ( 1999) portrayal of Thomas as having unique and
adamant views on these subjects.
39
U.S. v. Lopez (1995) is an excellent example ofThomas's use of original intent (see
also Schmidt 1997). It will be interesting in future research to see the degree to which this
is idiosyncratic for Thomas or whether other justices behave similarly over time on particular issues.
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Thomas exhibited Weakening behavior in 23.3% of his concurrences. Such a percentage would indicate that Thomas is
comfortable with reducing the scope and/or legitimacy of the
majority opinion. However, Weakening opinions could do the
most damage if the court's vote contained a minimum winning
coalition (typically 5-4 decisions), effectively turning a majority
opinion from a controlling precedent into a merely persuasive
plurality opinion. In fact, Thomas was much less likely to write
Weakening concurrences in such instances. 40 One explanation for
this behavior is that Thomas is hesitant to exercise his ability to
Weaken in cases where this action is most likely to have a negative impact on the legitimacy of the institution and the law. As
O'Brien (1996) notes, another possible explanation is that the
majority opinion writer may be more likely to accommodate
various views in his or her opinion for the Court in minimum
winning coalition cases because if such a compromise is not
made, a Court opinion may not result.
We expected that Weakening concurrences would most often
be special concurrences in which the justice agrees with the dispositional judgment of the Court but not with its reasoning. Special concurrences are more likely to weaken the opinion of the
Court and, therefore, the clarity of the law. A special concurrence, then, has greater repercussions for the institutional legitimacy of the Court than does a regular concurrence. Thomas did
not write a single Weakening regular concurrence. In other
words, he only engaged in Weakening behavior when he was
writing a special concurrence. That being said, Thomas did write
special concurrences that we did not code as weakening. Thus,
"Weakening" and "special concurrence" are not definitionally

0
Thomas wrote a Weakening opinion in only one of the fifteen cases (6.7%) which had
a minimum winning coalition .
'
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synonymous. Rather, Weakening is best understood as a subset
of special concurrences.
We applied the Defending code to 25% of Thomas's opinions.
In these cases, a justice goes beyond the point of law in the case
at hand to discuss his or her broader views on legal reasoning. In
Thomas's case, Defending most often took the form of discussing original intent. In fact, Thomas explicitly mentions the Framers in about half of the cases we coded as Defending. In Loving
v. United States, for example, Thomas spends about one-third of
his concurrence discussing the Framers' knowledge of English
military and Parliamentary histo7i, in this case criticizing the
majority's analysis of that history. 1 In the remainder of Defending cases, Thomas notes either agreement or disagreement with
the line of legal reasoning employed in another opinion. In
United States v. R.L.C., for example, Thomas echoes an argument made in Scalia's concurrence on the limitations of legislative history as an interpretive approach. 42
Opinions that were solely Preserving did nothing more than
note minor clarifications, argue with a dissent, or present historical information. These are the opinions that would describe what
has previously been expected of concurrences-they do little of
jurisprudential significance. The number of opinions that only
Preserved was somewhat small-20%. However, a full 40% of
Thomas's concurrences exhibited Preserving behavior. Hence, he
often Preserved when he also did other more meaningful tasks.
In those instances, it was likely a lengthy description of historical information that led to assignment of the Preserving code. It
may be the frequent appearance of such obvious dicta that has
led many to discount the value of concurrences. The fact that
half of Thomas's concurrences which display this behavior also
1
' 517
41

U .S. 748 (1996).
503 U .S. 291 (1992).
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exhibit another type of concurring behavior may indicate that
scholars have been too quick to assume that the presence of "judicial egocentrism" (Caldeira and Zorn 1998, 877) also means an
absence of substance.
Thomas's concurrences often met the requirements of more
than one code. The average number of codes per concurrence
was 1.78. Therefore, Thomas's concurrences often do more than
one thing-such as Weaken and Groundlay or Groundlay and
Signal. In other words, in one section of the concurrence he
might Groundlay while in another he may Defend. The variety of
combinations displayed in Table 4 suggests a great degree of
flexibility in combining strategies. That being said, the vast majority (79%) of concurrences employ two or fewer types of con curring behavior.
LESSONS LEARNED

Clearly, concurrences are not politically, legally, or historically insignificant. Seventy-five percent of Thomas's concurrences fall into one of the three jurisprudentially important
categories: Signaling, Groundlaying, or Weakening. This alone is
relatively compelling as it is a strong argument for why concurrences are opinions worthy of further study. Justice Thomas exhibits a clear willingness to use concurrences to not only indicate
a particular position, but also to advocate, especially through
Signaling and Groundlaying.
The absence of literature on the content of Supreme Court
concurrences leads one to assume there is not much to learn from
them. This effort, however, illustrates that not all concurrences
are alike. In some cases, concurrences are the sites of serious
doctrinal disagreements. Also, such opinions often include the
important jurisprudential work of outlining preferred legal doctrine for hopeful adoption in the future. Finally, concurrences
provide a window into the political dynamics of the Court. They
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illustrate where compromise could not be met in the majority
opinion and when a justice feels compelled to note his or her
disagreement with the Court's opinion.
Maveety (2002, 9) argues that the proliferation of concurrences may have "bifurcated judicial policy goal-seeking into
two, at times mutually exclusive dimensions: policy in case outcomes, and policy in doctrinal rules." 43 It seems that a justice's
vote with the majority would indicate his or her "policy in case
outcomes" preferences, while the content of his or her concurrence indicates a "doctrinal" preference. Thomas is using concurrences to seek both of his preferences; rather than suppressing
his doctrinal preferences, he chooses to write them in the concurrences, perhaps due to the ebb of consensual norms. One can
also see from the content of these concurrences both the instituTABLE4
FREQUENCIES OF CODE COMBINATIONS

Characteristic
Cases assigned only one code
Groundlaying only
Signaling only
Preserving only
Defending only
Weakening only
Cases assigned two codes
Cases assigned three or more codes

Frequency
28 (47.0%)

IO
4

12
I
I
19 (32.0%)
13 (22.0%)

tional constraint of stare decisis and one justice's attempt to
thwart it by signaling to future litigants that they must specifically argue against a precedent in order for the Court to consider
overturning it.
0

See also Baum ( 1997) on justices' pursuit of legal and policy goals.
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With the preceding lessons learned, we will continue (and encourage others to continue) to explore the significance of separate opinions. Our future work will compare the concurring
behavior of members of the Rehnquist Court and consider what
might explain variation in content. We will also consider whether
Rehnquist Court justices are so comfortable with the collapse of
consensus norms that they have all begun to write Weakening
concurrences at a rate that could compromise both the institution
of the Court and legal clarity. It will also be interesting to see
whether justices considered conservative and liberal concur in
similar fashion. Finally, do those who claim to be advocates of
judicial restraint write different kinds of opinions than do their
more activist colleagues? These are all important questions for
further study.
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